Softwar Chapter 5 Summary: Bitcoin as Cyber Power Projection
Below is a structured summary of Chapter 5, “Power Projection Tactics in Cyberspace,” from Softwar: A Novel Theory on Power Projection and the National Strategic Significance of Bitcoin. In earlier chapters, Lowery laid out how physical power projection operates in nature (Chapter 3) and in human societies (Chapter 4). Here, in Chapter 5, he applies those insights directly to the digital domain, introducing how cyberspace presents new ways to wield both abstract and physical power—and proposing that Bitcoin’s proof-of-work could function as a form of non-kinetic, electro-cyber power projection.
Chapter 5: Power Projection Tactics in Cyberspace
5.1 Introduction
Lowery opens by situating cyberspace as the new critical domain where resource competition increasingly occurs. Since entire economies, infrastructures, and communications depend on networks, the ability to secure (or attack) those networks confers huge power.
He reminds readers that physical power (watts) still underpins real-world security—so the key question is how to translate that into cyberspace effectively.
Recommended reading for context: The opening remarks on how national security, in the 21st century, depends on cyber resilience—especially for crucial digital resources.
5.2 Thinking Machines
Here, Lowery briefly discusses the rise of general-purpose, stored-program computers—“thinking machines” that can run any sort of program. These machines create a new frontier for power struggles.
People who write or control software can manipulate entire digital environments, up to and including financial systems, government agencies, and social platforms.
He highlights that typical software-based authority (e.g. system admin privileges) functions much like an abstract power hierarchy—a few individuals control outcomes for many.
Recommended reading: The comparison to historical power hierarchies—only now, control is exerted via software permissions.
5.3 A New (Exploitable) Belief System
Cyberspace, Lowery argues, also represents a belief system—it is intangible, built of data and shared protocols. When people trust or rely on software-based services, they effectively treat the underlying code as “law.”
But because so much trust is delegated to system operators or platform providers, cyberspace is highly prone to exploitation from within.
Recommended reading: This section’s emphasis on how “system admin” roles become the equivalent of “digital god-kings,” a concept he expands on later.
5.4 Software Security Challenges
Lowery outlines a suite of cyber vulnerabilities: hacking, malware, social engineering, and more. The deeper problem is that software alone can only impose logical constraints on users (e.g., access control lists). If an adversary gains privileged access, they can subvert rules from the inside.
He points out that purely logical security is trust-based (or “consensus-based”)—users trust the code or the administrators not to abuse their special privileges.
This is a fundamental limitation that physical security methods (e.g., armed guards, safes) do not share, because those can impose material costs on attackers.
Recommended reading: The discussion on how software “bugs” or insider attacks create massive risk when code is the sole source of authority.
5.5 Creating Abstract Power Hierarchies Using Software
Building on Chapter 4’s notion of “abstract authority,” Lowery shows that big platforms—cloud service providers, large social media companies—can become like unassailable feudal lords in the digital domain.
Their unregulated power stems from the trust that billions of users place in them.
He likens these digital power-holders to older forms of monarchy or oligarchy, where a small group can shape the “official record” (the code, the user database, the acceptable content) with minimal checks or balances.
Recommended reading: Examples of major tech companies that can, with a policy or code update, reshape entire business sectors.
5.6 Physically Resisting Neo-Technocratic God-Kings
Lowery’s term “neo-technocratic god-kings” refers to those who effectively rule cyberspace by controlling critical software or infrastructure. This rule is subtle—often invisible—yet extremely powerful.
He emphasizes that if these entities (whether large companies or centralized government bodies) ever choose to abuse their digital authority, typical users have little recourse.
They can’t physically fight back in the sense of wrestling away a server, because that’s rarely feasible or legal.
Recommended reading: His warnings that too much reliance on centralized platforms or administrators can lead to a new form of digital serfdom.
5.7 Projecting Physical Power in, from, and through Cyberspace
This is a pivotal section. Lowery notes that, historically, to physically secure resources in other domains—land, sea, air, space—nations use “hard-power” deterrents like armies or fleets. But in cyberspace, all previous options revolve around logical constraints.
He proposes that, for true deterrence, one needs to integrate real-world physical costs (watts) into the digital domain, in a non-destructive, non-lethal way. That is the key to physically securing bits of information.
Recommended reading: The overarching premise that a system imposing actual energy costs on malicious actors could solve fundamental security holes in software-based networks.
5.8 Electro-Cyber Dome Security Concept
Lowery sketches a conceptual “electro-cyber dome,” akin to the popular idea of an “Iron Dome” missile-defense system, but for cyberspace.
He describes it as a technology architecture where any unauthorized or malicious attempt to manipulate a network must pay an immense energy price—rendering attacks financially or logistically infeasible.
This concept builds on the idea that if the attacker can’t feasibly muster the energy cost to break the system’s “defensive perimeter,” it deters them in the same way a high castle wall deters siege attempts.
Recommended reading: His analogy to physical fortifications—only the “walls” here are an imposed requirement for real power expenditure.
5.9 Novel Computer Theory about Bitcoin
Here, Lowery dives deeper into Bitcoin’s proof-of-work system. He suggests that, unlike typical software, Bitcoin uses mathematically verifiable physical costs (through hashing) to constrain participants. Every miner must invest electricity, which translates to real-world energy.
Because these costs are unforgeable, participants effectively pledge a measure of physical power to secure the network. Lowery frames this as a revolutionary shift: “the global electric power grid is being harnessed as a planet-scale computer.”
Recommended reading: The sections describing how proof-of-work forms a “chain down” design, physically tethering the software’s state to energy expenditure in the real world.
5.10 There Is No Second Best
Lowery highlights that Bitcoin is by far the largest and most widely adopted proof-of-work network to date, making it extremely hard (practically impossible) for an alternative to replicate the same level of physical security.
He cites the “There is no second best” mantra (popularized by Michael Saylor), emphasizing how crucial a vast, decentralized coalition of miners is to achieving effectively unassailable cost deterrence.
Recommended reading: The rationale behind why a smaller proof-of-work network can be more easily attacked and thus is not a “close second” to Bitcoin’s security model.
5.11 Softwar
Here, Lowery crystallizes the entire concept he has been building toward: “softwar.”
He argues that Bitcoin is not just “digital money,” but an electro-cyber warfighting protocol—a method for imposing real physical costs (via electricity usage) on bad actors in or through cyberspace.
This effectively neutralizes many of the trust-based vulnerabilities in software systems, offering a zero-trust, physically secured network.
He likens it to a new branch of national defense—like an “Army” for land or a “Navy” for the sea. He suggests that nations who adopt or support robust Bitcoin mining gain a strategic advantage in cyber defense, while those who don’t may be outpaced or at risk.
Recommended reading: The detailed argument that “softwar” can deter certain forms of aggression, just like a standing army, but through non-lethal, energy-based competition.
5.12 Mutually Assured Preservation
Lowery concludes Chapter 5 by playing on the nuclear concept of Mutually Assured Destruction.
He sees proof-of-work blockchains as a system that could lead to something akin to “Mutually Assured Preservation” in cyberspace: if all major powers harness a global proof-of-work network, the cost of attacking or censoring each other’s digital resources becomes prohibitive, leading to a stable peace.
It’s a lofty vision: instead of pointing nukes at each other, countries ensure that all malicious attempts in cyberspace cost more energy than is worthwhile—reducing destructive conflict without resorting to lethal force.
Chapter 5 Summary
In Chapter 5, Lowery brings together the threads from prior chapters—physical power in nature, abstract power in human societies—and applies them to cyberspace.
He argues that “purely logical” software security is fragile and trust-dependent, opening the door to abuses by administrators or hackers. The missing piece, he says, is a credible, energy-based deterrence: a system that forces would-be attackers to pay steep real-world costs.
Lowery contends Bitcoin’s proof-of-work accomplishes this goal by requiring participants to burn significant electricity for block creation, thus limiting the ability of any single entity to rewrite or override the system without monumental expenditure.
He believes large-scale adoption of proof-of-work represents a new, peaceful “softwar” approach—letting computers impose physical costs on adversaries inside cyberspace.
Sections to Revisit for More Depth
5.4 Software Security Challenges – Essential background on why conventional security approaches depend on trusting privileged insiders.
5.7 Projecting Physical Power in, from, and through Cyberspace – If you need more on how a military framework applies to the cyber domain.
5.9 Novel Computer Theory about Bitcoin – Explains how “planet-scale computing” links the digital ledger to actual energy use.
5.11 Softwar – The crucial conceptual leap where Lowery recasts Bitcoin as non-kinetic warfighting technology.
5.12 Mutually Assured Preservation – Parallel to nuclear deterrence, describing how proof-of-work’s costliness might produce a stable deterrent effect online.
That’s the essence of Chapter 5, illustrating why Lowery sees Bitcoin as more than money—it’s a brand-new mode of physically securing digital assets, akin to an “electro-cyber” defensive force.